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While PacifiCorp appreciated the Commission's recognition that additional obsolescence
needed to be removed from the Bureau's HCLD cost approach, it believed the magnitude of the
Commission's adjustment was still inadequate and appealed to the district court for de novo
review. R. 00061 ,; 35.
The district court conducted a five day trial during which it "had the special opportunity of
listening to each witness as he gave live testimony and was subjected to rigorous cross
examination." R. 00062'; 37.
PacifiCorp relied primarily on the expert testimony of Thomas K. Tegarden, a "respected
expert in valuation methodology with 40 years of experience in valuing electric utility operating
properties.,,2 R. 00061 ,; 36.
After receiving and weighing all the evidence, the district court, concluded that
PacifiCorp's book depreciation was "not calculated for the purposes of estimating the true
difference between original cost and current market value" and that it did "not account for all
forms of functional and external obsolescence that may affect [the value of the] electric utility's
assets." R. 00060'; 30. A copy of the district court's Memorandum of Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law is attached as Addendum 1.

2 PacifiCorp also called two additional witnesses who had considerable experience in the areas of
utility regulation and valuation: (1) Mr. Steven R. McDougal, PacifiCorp's Director of Revenue
Requirement, who had more than 26 years of electric utility regulatory expertise, and (2) Mr.
Norman K. Ross, PacifiCorp's Director of Tax, who is a CPA, holds an ABV designation
(Accreditation in Business Valuation) from the American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants, and has more than 20 years of utility property tax experience.
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ARGUMENT

When this Court reviews a district court's decision, it does not set aside factual findings
"unless clearly erroneous." Idaho R. Civ. P. Rule 52(a). Furthermore, Idaho law requires that
"regard shall be given to the special opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of those
witnesses who appear personally before it." Id This Court has recognized that "[i]t is the
province of the trial judge to weigh the conflicting evidence and testimony and to judge the
credibility of witnesses." The Senator, Inc. v. Ada County Bd o/Equalization, 138 Idaho 566,
569,67 P.3d 45,48 (2003). Although the district court's factual findings must be supported by
"substantial evidence," "[e]vidence is regarded as substantial if a reasonable trier of fact would
accept it and rely upon it in determining whether a disputed point of fact has been proven." Id
The Commission's entire brief is devoted to its criticisms of the appraisal evidence
submitted by PacifiCorp in support of its asserted value. With respect to the weight of the
evidence, the district court held that "PacifiCorp has established by a preponderance of the
evidence that the estimated Idaho valuation placed on PacifiCorp's operating property ... was
erroneous [and that] the estimated Idaho valuation proposed by PacifiCorp is correct."
R. 00055 ~ 12. The district court also specifically addressed credibility when it found that the
testimony and opinions ofPacifiCorp's expert witness, Mr. Tegarden, concerning the unit
valuation ofPacifiCorp's operating property was "more credible, more reliable, more persuasive,
and entitled to greater weight than the testimony and opinions of the witnesses for the Tax

R. 00064 ~ 44. The resulting income indicator of $8,242,000,000 was higher than the Bureau.'s
income indicator of$7,761,521,809. R. 00060 ~ 31 and R. 00065 ~ 47.
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provided proof that the external obsolescence affected the value ofPacifiCorp's operating
property. The district court evaluated five days of evidence and testimony and ultimately
concluded that PacifiCorp's operating property suffered from additional external obsolescence.

A.

The Commission's Claim That Obsolescence Does Not Exist Must Be Rejected
In Light Of The Commission's Own Finding Of Obsolescence.

Idaho law requires an assessor to adjust the cost indicator for obsolescence. Idaho Admin.
Code R. 405.05.b (1999)("The appraiser shall attempt to measure obsolescence, if any exists. If
obsolescence is found to exist, it may be considered in the cost approach."). When PacifiCorp
appealed its assessment to the Commission, the Commission observed that Mr. Rudd had used the
HCLD method to determine the cost indicator and that he made no adjustment for additional
depreciation because he believed that all obsolescence "was included in the accounting
depreciation amount." R.00017. The Commission rejected Mr. Rudd's cost indicator, and
allowed an additional "functional and economic (or external) obsolescence adjustment of7.93% to
the HCLD." R. 00061

~

33.

When PacifiCorp appealed the assessment to the district court for de novo review, the
Commission's decision was the subject of the appeal. Inasmuch as the Commission had already
rejected the Bureau's cost indicator, one would have expected the Commission to advocate a
minor external obsolescence adjustment to the cost indicator which would have been consistent
with its prior findings. However, the Commission completely changed its position and claimed
that the Bureau's HCLD method now fully accounted for all depreciation and that there should be
no adjustment for external obsolescence. Ironically, the Commission's new position was also
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Commission considered PacifiCorp's appeal, it apparently concluded that there was sufficient
evidence to support its finding of additional obsolescence. Yet now the Commission claims that
PacifiCorp's appraisal "should be disallowed because it merely assumes obsolescence."
Commission's Brief, p. 4. The Commission's attempt to impose a higher standard of proof at this
level of review than it found necessary during the Board of Equalization proceeding should be
rejected.

B.

Substantial Evidence Supports The District Court's Findings Regarding
Obsolescence Experienced By PacifiCorp's Operating Property.

The Commission claims that PacifiCorp has not provided adequate evidence to support its
claim of external obsolescence and invites this Court to articulate a standard requiring proof of
cause, amount, and actual effect. Commission's Brief, pp. 15-18. The suggestion that the Court
impose the Commission's recommended standard implies that the district court evaluated
PacifiCorp's evidence without regard to any standard of proof. In fact, the district court made
specific findings regarding PacifiCorp's evidence ofthe cause of obsolescence as well as the
extent to which obsolescence actually affects its operating property.
The district court found that Mr. Tegarden identified several contributory causes to
obsolescence and identified the primary cause of the obsolescence as governmental regulation.

R. 00063

~

41. Specifically, the court found that because PacifiCorp "is not allowed ... to

automatically include the new property in its rate base until it has filed a rate case and received an
order from the appropriate commission authorizing inclusion of the new properties ...
PacifiCorp's earnings are negatively affected.until and if a favorable rate increase is allowed."
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Mr. McDougal, the Director of Revenue Requirements for PacifiCorp with more than 26
years of electric utility regulatory experience, testified that regulation results in a delay of revenue
increases, "especially in the power cost area where costs are higher than the amounts that we're
allowed to recover" and explained that the timing of rate cases delays a public utility's ability to
recover those costs when they are incurred. Tr. Vol. I, p. 163, L. 11-18. Mr. McDougal also
identified additional causes of external obsolescence for PacifiCorp's operating property: (1) the
regulatory requirement that PacifiCorp use historic test year data to establish future rates for
electricity results in an under recovery of capital and costs; (2) inter-jurisdictional allocation
procedures which result in an under recovery of both capital and operating costs; (3) absence of
power cost mechanisms which would facilitate timely recovery of electricity generation costs
outside formal rate case proceedings; and (4) political factors which favor or disfavor particular
energy sources in differing states have resulted in an under recovery for invested capital. See Tr.
Vol. I, p. 170-184 and Exhibit 19. 6 In addition to identifying these causes of obsolescence, Mr.
McDougal explained how these factors were causing an actual loss of value to PacifiCorp's
property.7 Id

Mr. McDougal also testified that PacifiCorp has been earning less than the

weighted average cost of capital for "at least the last 10 years." Tr. Vol. III, p. 129, L. 23-24.

In 2006, the Idaho State Tax Commission found that regulatory lag would "be a continuing
contributory element in economic obsolescence" for PacifiCorp's operating properties. Ex. 31,
Tr. Vol. II, p. 249, L. 4 - p. 251, L. 10.
6

For example, Mr. McDougal explained that one rate case filed with the Idaho Public Utilities
Commission was filed on May 28, 2010, using 2009 as the base period and requesting rate
increases effective January 1, 2011. Tr. Vol. I, p. 164. In the meantime, PacifiCorp continues to
make more investments in its property which are not included in the rate case. For example, in
7
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reasoning in resolving each of the conflicts," but that they would identify "those material facts and
expert opinions that have been established by credible and competent evidence." R. 00054, 10

(emphasis in original). On the basis of the evidence identified above, the district court concluded
that PacifiCorp's operating property was experiencing external obsolescence as a direct result of
factors associated with rate regulation. R. 00058-59,,24-26 and R. 00063 , 41. These findings
are supported by substantial evidence.
There is also substantial evidence in the record supporting the district court's conclusion
regarding the quantification of external obsolescence. Mr. Tegarden used the capitalization of
income loss method to identify and quantify PacifiCorp's external obsolescence. The district
court found that this was a "generally accepted" appraisal technique for measuring external
obsolescence. R. 00062,39. The district court also observed that this was "the same method
used by the Tax Commission in a 2006 valuation case involving PacifiCorp." Id., Tr. Vol. II,
p. 249, L. 4 - p. 21, L. 19, Trial Exhibit 31 (2006 BOE decision). 8
The capitalization of income loss method is based on the assumption that a willing,
informed buyer of rate regulated utility properties will expect to earn a competitive rate of return
on their investment. The methodology is widely approved by appraisal textbooks as well as case
law. The Appraisal Institute, Appraisal ofReal Estate, 443-444 (13 th ed. 2008). An
authoritative textbook definition of external obsolescence, quoted by Mr. Tegarden, explained that
8 In the 2006 Decision, offered as Trial Exhibit 31 to the district court, the Commission
"recognize[d] the presence of economic obsolescence because [PacifiCorp's] average earned rate
of return for at least the last two years [was] substantially below its allowed rate ofretum an
electric industry performance." Trial Ex. 31, In the matter of the 2006 Operating Property Ad
Valorem Valuation ofPacifiCorp, Decision, No. 19561 (Sept. 7,2006).
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"testimony and opinions [were] more credible, more reliable, more persuasive, and entitled to
greater weight than the testimony and opinions of the witnesses for the Tax Commission."

R. 00062 ~ 37. Substantial evidence on the record established that various elements of
government regulation are causing external obsolescence in this matter and that PacifiCorp's
earning have been directly impacted by regulatory requirements and restrictions.
The Commission cites to five cases for the proposition that the taxpayer must identify the
cause of the obsolescence and then quantify the impact on the subject property: Eurofresh, Inc. v.
Graham County, 187 P.3d 530 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007);10 American Crystal Sugar Co. v. County of
Polk, Nos. CI-05-574, C4-06-367, 2009 WL 2431376 (Minn. Tax Ct. Aug. 5,2009); Wal Mart
Stores, Inc. v. Wayne Twp. Assessor, 825 N.E.2d 485 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2005); Canal Square Ltd

10 The Commission's suggestion that Eurofresh demonstrates that PacifiCorp did not satisfy its
burden of demonstrating external obsolescence is incorrect. In Eurofi-esh, the taxpayer used the
market extraction method to identify obsolescence by utilizing the distress sale prices of
greenhouses which were significantly smaller than the Eurofresh property to suggest that "the
obsolescence evidenced by the three other greenhouse sales is market-wide and for that reason,
must necessarily affect the value of [its] greenhouse." Id. at 535. The Court referred to
Appraisal of Real Estate which warns that "the market extraction method should be used only
when the comparable properties relied upon 'have incurred similar amounts and types of
depreciation' as the subject property." Id. at 538. Thus, the Arizona court held that "[i]t is not
sufficient ... to simply assert that a property's value should be reduced because of external
obsolescence observed elsewhere." Id. at 538. The court refused to find obsolescence because
"Eurofresh offered no evidence that its Willcox greenhouse suffered from the same impairment."
The failure of Eurofresh to prove that the factors which caused obsolescence in the comparable
properties affected its own properties proved fatal to its claim. The Eurofi-esh decision is
inapplicable because PacifiCorp did not rely on the market extraction method to demonstrate
obsolescence. Instead, Mr. Tegarden used the capitalization of income loss method which
evaluates the external obsolescence experienced directly by the property, rather than attempting to
extrapolate obsolescence experienced by other, unrelated properties based on an assumption that
the obsolescence is market-wide.
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expectation that this will be reduced to 3.3 months." Commission's Brief, p. 17. It also professes
ignorance regarding "[h]ow much ofPacifiCorp's assets are not included in rate base because they
were financed by deferred income taxes." Id. at 18. The district court's factual findings were
based on substantial evidence provided by PacifiCorp and the Commission.
With respect to regulatory lag, the Commission's representation of the lapse of time
between putting assets into place and achieving a rate increase is based on Exhibit 522 which is a
document created in 2005 outlining optimistic projections of possible reductions to the regulatory
lag problem experienced by PacifiCorp. That document projected that PacifiCorp hoped to
reduce regulatory lag to 6.2 months by 2009 and optimistically projected a further reduction to 3.3
months for the following year. Not only was the document not indicative of the regulatory lag
actually experienced by PacifiCorp during and prior to the subject year, but Mr. McDougal also
testified that PacifiCorp was never able to achieve the expectations set forth in Exhibit 522. Ir.
Vol. III, p. 127, L. 17-19. Furthermore, in the 2006 appeal, the Commission recognized that
regulatory lag "will be a continuing contributory element in economic obsolescence." Ir.
Vol. III, p. 250, L. 9 - p. 251 L. 10. The evidence of regulatory lag actually experienced by
PacifiCorp was illustrated in the "Chronology of a Rate Case" prepared by Mr. McDougal and
designated as Exhibit 19, Slide 7. Mr. McDougal used a recent rate case to illustrate that property
acquired during a particular year would not be included in the rate base until at least one year (and
as many as two years) after the property was put into operation. Ir. Vol. I, p. 164, L. 12 - p. 169,
L. 4. Based on this testimony, the district court's found that "it ordinarily takes six to eighteen
months after filing for a utilities commission to process and rule on a rate filing. As a result ofthis
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Hodgins v. Sales, 139 Idaho 225, 229, 76 P.3d 969,973 (2003). "Additionally, this Court will not
substitute its view ofthe facts for that of the trial court." Borah v. McCandless, 147 Idaho 73,205
P.3d 1209, 1213 (2009). All of the arguments raised by the Commission were previously
considered and rejected by the district court. The Court dismissed those objections stating that it
had "reviewed the criticisms ofMr. Tegarden's valuations but finds them to be unpersuasive." R.
00066 ~ 48. 11 Substantial evidence supports the district court's finding that "Mr. Tegarden's
estimate of the value ofPacifiCorp's operating property as of January 1,2008, is the most accurate
estimate of value in the record." R. 00066 ~ 49. The findings of the district court should not be
disturbed.

A.

The Record Does Not Support The Commission's Claim That PacifiCorp's
Book Depreciation Is Self-Reported And Accounts For All Obsolescence.

The Commission's allegation that PacifiCorp's book depreciation is self-reported to the
various state public utility commissions ("PUCs") and thus accounts for all forms of obsolescence
is simply not supported by the trial evidence. It is inaccurate to assert that PacifiCorp
"self-reports" because the depreciation rates are set by the PUCs, not by PacifiCorp. The
uncontroverted testimony ofMr. McDougal established that PacifiCorp submits a proposed
depreciation study to the various state utility commissions about every five years. Tr. Vol. I,
The district court explained that it's "findings of fact will not include matters that have not been
established by the weight of the credible evidence." R. 00054 ~ 10. Thus, the fact that each of
the issues raised by the Commission may not be specifically addressed in the district court's
decision, does not mean it was not fully considered. Indeed there was substantial testimony and
evidence admitted regarding each issue raised by the Commission in objection to Mr. Tegarden's
testimony and PacifiCorp's appraisal. "After hearing all the evidence and considering the
applicable law," the district court concluded that "[t]he preponderance of the evidence []
establishes that the estimated Idaho valuation proposed by PacifiCorp is correct." R. 00055 ~ 12.
11
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Commission's own witness testified that one cannot assert that regulatory reporting "precisely
picks up every possible form of obsolescence." Tr. Vol. V, p. 15, L. 12-21.
On the basis of the testimony and evidence before it, the district court held that "[b ]ook
depreciation is not calculated for the purpose of estimating the true difference between original
cost and current market value. It does not account for all forms of functional and external
obsolescence that may affect an electric utility'S assets." R. 00060,-r 30. The overwhelming
evidence in the record, including the Commission's own decision to adjust the cost indicator for
additional obsolescence, supports the district court's decision. 12

B.

The Commission's Attempt To Discredit PacifiCorp's Appraisal By Claiming
That A Company Not Earning Its Cost Of Capital Will Alwavs Operate In
The Red Demonstrates A Fundamental Misunderstanding Of Financial
Principles.

In 2006, the Commission determined that PacifiCorp's operating property was
experiencing external obsolescence because PacifiCorp's "average earned rate or return for at least
the last two years [was] substantially below its allowed rate of return." Trial Ex. 31, p. 8. In this
matter, the district court held that the capitalization of income loss method used by Mr. Tegarden is
"the same method used by the Tax Commission in [the] 2006 valuation case involving
PacifiCorp." R. 00062-63 ,-r 39.

12 Notwithstanding the Commission's own finding of additional obsolescence, the Commission
makes the unfortunate accusation that "PacifiCorp either filed falsely with FERC or Mr. Tegarden
seeks to subtract obsolescence twice." Commission's Brief, p. 5. This is the first of many
attempts to disparage Mr. Tegarden and PacifiCorp. This unprofessional name-calling is
particularly inappropriate in this forum where the credibility of the witness is not an issue. The
Senator, Inc., 138 Idaho 566, 67 P.3d 45,48 (2003)("It'is the province of the trial judge to weigh
the conflicting evidence and testimony and to judge the credibility of witnesses.")
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will operate in the black. Thus, the Commission's claim that a company which does not "attain its
cost of capital ... must always operate in the red" is simply wrong. Commission's Brief, p. 7.
The Commission also challenges Mr. Tegarden's use of the capitalization of income loss
method to quantify the amount of obsolescence because it does not account for the "additional
benefit" ofDIT. Commission's Brief, p. 7. According to the Commission, when this "benefit"
is taken into account, "PacifiCorp's real cost of capital is approximately 7%, not 9.1 %."
Commission's Brief, p. 8. This claim is based on an off-hand comment by Dr. Johnson which
contradicts the Commission's own cost of capital calculation of 8.89% and its expert witness'
testimony that the cost of capital was 8.72%. Commission's Brief, p. 14. When asked to explain
. his comment that he thought the cost of capital might be in the 7% range, Dr. Johnson could not
recall that he had made such a statement. Tr. Vol. V, p. 47, L. 22 - p. 48, L. 2. Dr. Johnson
admitted that he had not been asked to determine cost of capital, Tr. Vol. V, p. 47 L. 17; that he had
not performed a cost of capital study, Tr. Vol. V, p. 49, L. 5-13; and that he was not trying to
suggest that Messrs. Rudd, Eyre and Tegarden had made a mistake in their cost of capital
calculations. Tr. Vol. V, p. 51, L. 17-24.
By the Commission's and Mr. Eyre's own calculations, PacifiCorp's cost of capital
exceeds its return on investment. The capitalization of income loss method is a generally
accepted appraisal method used to quantify the loss in earnings in terms of an obsolescence
calculation. PacifiCorp does not claim to be operating in the red, and does not need to be in such
dire straits in order to qualify for an obsolescence adjustment. In short, the Commission gloats
over solving a Holmesian mystery which simply does not exist in this case.
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assertion. In that case, Pacific Power & Light ("PPL") used the value of property purchased with
DIT and income tax credits ("ITC") as a "surrogate for the obsolescence" and deducted the value
of that property from its cost approach. The Court acknowledged that "regulation to some extent
diminishes the earning potential of regulated property," but held that "[a]bsent any satisfactory
evidence establishing an appropriate measure of obsolescence, it is inappropriate to make any
deduction for it by "subtracting in toto the values for DIT and ITC [property]." Pacific Power,
775 P.2d at 308.
Unlike PPL, PacifiCorp did not simply deduct the dollar amount reported in the
accumulated DIT account from the cost approach. The starting point for PacifiCorp's cost
approach calculation was the historic cost of all of PacijiCorp 's property from which accounting
depreciation was deducted (the historic cost less depreciation or "HCLD" approach). PacifiCorp
then calculated its average net rate of return on all its plant in service and compared that to an
"investor-market required rate of return." R. 00059 ~ 27. Because PacifiCorp's rate of return
was 20.88% less than the market required rate of return, PacifiCorp made an adjustment of20.88%
to the HCLD book value. R. 00063-00064, ~ 42. Unlike PPL, PacifiCorp did not use a
"surrogate" for obsolescence by "assign[ing] zero value" to some group of properties as alleged by
the Commission. Instead, PacifiCorp provided "satisfactory evidence establishing an appropriate
measure of obsolescence." Id. 775 P.2d at 308.
The district judge found that PacifiCorp is only permitted to earn a return on its rate base.
R. 00057-58

~

22. It agreed that rate regulation "affects PacifiCorp's earnings," R. 00059 ~ 26,
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I knew from my personal experience in observing the industry over the last 25,30
years that in most transactions ... it's very clear that the buyer paid somewhere in
the vicinity of net book value or in excess of it. ... Just a whole series of
transactions over 20 to 30 years in my career that I have observed people are always
paying a premium. The question is how large the premium is.
Tr. Vol. V, p. 67, L. 23 - p. 68, L. 14.
Pretty typical for -- with these types of transactions for most, if not all, of the
premium to go to goodwill. ...
Tr. Vol. V, p. 80, L. 3-5.
[I]t is common to see the difference between the market value of the property, plant
and equipment as a going concern and the carrying value of a net book value, to see
that difference show up as a goodwill entry in the accounting.
Tr. Vol. V, p. 84, L. 2-7.
Mr. Eyre, the Commission's other expert, testified that $1.074 billion of the purchase price
for the stock "was booked as goodwill [as] a premium paid for the stock." Tr. Vol. III, p. 38,
L. 12-15. He also testified that he did not remove the goodwill from his value indicators. Tr.

Vol. III, p. 39, L. 25 - p. 40, L. 12. The district court rejected Mr. Eyre's use of the stock and debt
approach "in view ofthe facts that PacifiCorp does not have publicly traded stock, and the price of
its sale to a subsidiary ofMEHC in 2006 included a significant amount of goodwill." R. 00065
~

45.
The Commission's objection to PacifiCorp's appraisal because it does not factor in the

2006 sale ofPacifiCorp to MEHC also ignores the fact that its own witness, Mr. Rudd, "did not use
[the stock and debt] approach because of the difficulty in arriving at accurate assumptions and
estimations." R. 00065

~

45.
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The district court found that Mr. Tegarden's testimony was the most credible and observed that, in
his opinion, "the income approach resulted in a far more accurate estimate of valuation than the
HCLD approach." R. 00066 ~ 47. 15 The Commission's persistent accusations of dishonesty,
manipulation, and deceit are unprofessional as well as legally improper. The credibility ofMr.
Tegarden is simply not an issue for the appellate court. The Senator, Inc., 138 Idaho at 569,67
P.3d at 48 (2003).

F.

The Capitalization Of Income Loss Method Does Not Reduce The Cost
Approach To The Income Approach.

The Commission argues that the capitalization of income loss approach reduces the cost
approach to an income approach. 16 This criticism ignores the fact that Idaho law requires an
assessor to consider economic or external obsolescence. Idaho Admin. Code R. 405.05.b (1999)
("The appraiser shall attempt to measure obsolescence, if any exists. If obsolescence is found to
exist, it may be considered in the cost approach.") In the commercial context, "loss of value
usually means a decrease in the property's income-generating ability." Hometowne Associates,
839 N.E.2d at 274. Thus, external obsolescence is properly quantified by examining property's
income-generating ability. Inasmuch as Idaho law requires an adjustment to the cost indicator for
15 What makes the Commission's accusations even more troubling is that the Commission ignores
the fact that the income indicator used by Mr. Tegarden was nearly half a billion dollars higher
than the income indicator used by Mr. Rudd. See note 2, supra. If PacifiCorp and its witnesses
were truly acting "surreptitiously," they would not be asserting a higher income indicator than that
asserted by the Commission.

The Commission states that PacifiCorp's appraisal "uses 'obsolescence in the air' to reduce the
cost approach to the income approach." Commission's Brief, p. 12. The phrase "obsolescence
in the air" is not defined and PacifiCorp is not entirely sure of what the Commission is trying to
suggest by that phrase.
16
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Dr. lohnson, in his report (Trial Ex. 533) acknowledged the relationship between income
information and obsolescence determinations when he stated:
Assuming economic obsolescence exists, it may be quantified by comparing the
value of the property as it currently exists with what the value would be assuming
the conditions causing the obsolescence were not present. In practice one way of
estimating the impact of economic obsolescence is to compare the income
produced by the subject property with the income which would be expected in the
absence of the conditions which cause the obsolescence and capitalizing the
difference.
Tr. Vol. V, p. 18, L. 25 - p. 19, L. 10. Finally, in its decision in the 2006 PacifiCorp appeal, the
Commission recognized that under earning was indicative of obsolescence and determined that the
cost approach should be adjusted to account for economic obsolescence. Trial Ex. 31, p. 8.
The Commission's disavowal of its witnesses' testimony and prior practice is insufficient
to refute the substantial evidence which supports the district court's determination that the
capitalization of income loss method is accepted appraisal methodology. See discussion supra at
Section 1.B. 18

18 The Commission's reference to the United Tel. Co. v. Dep't ofRev., 770 P.2d 43 (Or. 1989) is
also unavailing. The Commission suggests that this matter and United Tel. are similar because, in
both cases, the taxpayer's appraiser started with HCLD and "then subtracted ... a figure for
obsolescence." Commission's Brief, p. 12. The fundamental difference between that case and
PacifiCorp's is that, unlike Mr. Davis, Mr. Tegarden did not use a calculation which
mathematically converted the cost approach to the income approach. That distinction should be
readily apparent from the fact that Mr. Tegarden's adjustment to the HCLD approach resulted in a
cost indicator which exceeded the income indicator by more than half a billion dollars.
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H.

Subjectivity In The Appraisal Process Is Not A Meaningful Objection To
PacifiCorp's Obsolescence Calculations.

The Commission's final criticism ofPacifiCorp's appraisal is its claim that the
capitalization of income loss methodology is "too subjective" because any change in one of the
factors utilized could have a substantial impact on the resulting obsolescence estimate.
Commission's Brief, pp. 14-15. Subjectivity in appraisal practice is precisely the reason why
parties with opposing viewpoints present extensive evidence and testimony by expert witnesses to
support their respective positions. The district court addressed this very fact and found that
"[ d]ifferences of opinion do not mean that any of the witnesses was being deliberately untruthful.
Contradictory versions of facts and opinions in the presentation of testimony often result ...
especially from honest differences of expert opinion." R. 00054 ~ 11. Mr. Eyre, the
Commission's own witness, likewise testified that "almost all of the appraisal indicators have
large amounts of subjectivity and that's what creates the controversy." Tr. Vol. III, p. 49,
L. 15-18.

The fact that the experts differed in their opinions regarding the weighted average cost of
capital does not mean that the methodology is "too subjective." The differences in opinion are
precisely why the judge has the "special opportunity ... to judge the credibility of those witnesses
who appear personally before it." Idaho R. Civ. P. Rule 52(a). The Commission's witnesses
presented two different opinions regarding the appropriate weighted average cost of capital. The
Commission's estimate was 8.89%, Mr. Eyre's was 8.72%, Commission's Brief, p. 14.
Commission's Brief, p. 8. In contrast, PacifiCorp stood by a single cost of capital estimate of
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CONCLUSION
The Commission claims that Pacifi Corp did not meet its burden of proof because it relied
on an allegedly flawed appraisal. Commission's Brief, pp. 18_19. 19 The district court reviewed
the appraisal and all of the testimony proffered by a variety of experts over the course of five days.
The trial court is unequivocal in its conclusion that Mr. Tegarden's testimony and opinions were
"more credible, more reliable, more persuasive, and entitled to greater weight than the testimony
and opinions of the witnesses for the Tax Commission." R. 00062

~

37. The Commission has

failed to offer the level of evidence required to demonstrate clear error in the district court's factual
findings. Kennedy, 151 Idaho 440, 259 P.3d 586 (2011) citing Hodgins, 139 Idaho 225, 229, 76
P.3d 969,973 (2003)("Where findings of fact are supported by substantial and competent, though
conflicting, evidence, they are not clearly erroneous and thus will not be disturbed by this
Court.")(emphasis added).
The district court evaluated all of the evidence and concluded that PacifiCorp's estimate
value was "the most accurate estimate of value in the record." R. 00066 ~ 49. The Court
specifically found that PacifiCorp had proven error in the original assessment when it stated,
"Implicit in this conclusion is the additional conclusion that the estimate of value of
$8,877,075,014.99 in the Tax Commission's decision necessarily is erroneous." Id. For all of
the reasons stated above, this Court should find that substantial evidence supports the district
court's factual findings and affirm the ruling of the district court.

19 The Commission's claim that PacifiCorp has not met its burden of proof is a basic restatement
of the Commission's main argument challenging the district court's factual findings.
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V.
STATE OF IDAHO,
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CASE NO CV 0818158
MEMORANDUM OF FINDINGS OF
FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF
LAW
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This is an action seeking judicial review or appeal of a decision by the Idaho
Tax Commission concerning assessed valuation of operating property of PacifiCorp
for property tax purposes. The matter was presented to the court in a trial de novo
starting on July 12, 20010, and concluding on July 19,2010. PacifiCorp was·
represen.ted by David J. Crapo and Richard J. Armstrong. The State was
represented by Lawrence G. Allen and Erick M. Shaner. The parties submitted
post-trial memoranda on August 9, 2010. The court, being fully advised, enters the
following memorandum of findings offact and conclusions of law.
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. In this case, the attorneys have been such a pleasure to work with that I probably would

not have been disappointed if the case had continued for several more days. Thank you all for the
professional, competent, and courteous manner in which you conducted the trial.
2. This memorandum constitutes the court's findings of fact and conclusions of law.
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7. Based on the 2003 amendments to I.C. § 63-409(2) and based on the court's
memorandum and order entered on June 28, 2010, the court will not apply the old
burden of proof of clear and convincing evidence and will not require a showing
that the decision of the Tax Commission was manifestly excessive, arbitrary and
capricious, or fraudulent and oppressive. Instead, the court will apply the
preponderance of evidence burden of proof and will require only that PacifiCorp
show by a preponderance of the evidence that the decision of the tax commission
was erroneous.
8. An appeal from an assessment of valuation of operating property is to be
heard as a trial de novo without a jury and "in the same manner as though it were
an original proceeding.... " I.C. § 63-409(1). Trial de novo means "a trying of the
matter anew-the same as if it had never been heard before." Gilbert v. Moore, 108
Idaho 165,168,697 P.2d 1179 (1985); Canyon County Board of Equalization v.

Amalgamated Sugar Company, LLC, 143 Idaho 58, 61, 137 P.3d 445 (2006). Thus,
while the decision of the Idaho Tax Commission forms the basis of the appeal, the
record of the commission hearing is not examined for error in the traditional sense;
in fact the record is not before the de novo court. Rather, the court hears the case as
a new hearing or as a hearing for a second time. In many respects it hears the case
as a court of original rather than appellate jurisdiction. Compare, Beker Industries,

Inc. v. Georgetown Irrigation District, 101 Idaho 187, 190, 610 P.2d 546 (1980). The
de novo trial court's decision, nevertheless, must include an implicit determination
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10. The findings of fact will not include matters that have not been
established by the weight of the credible evidence. In keeping with the spirit of Rule

52(a), the court's findings will not restate every item of documentary evidence or
every item of testimony or every expert opinion. The findings will not contain a
recitation of conflicts in the evidence or the court's reasoning in resolving each of
the conflicts. The findings will consist only of a recitation of those material facts and
expert opinions that have been established by credible and competent evidence to be
more probably true than not true and that bear on the issues that legally may be
addressed.

11. This case in many respects was a battle of the experts. The expert
opinions derived from the evidence were contradictory. This is not surprising,
considering that there is very little science but a great deal of art in valuing
property. Differences of opinion do not mean that any of the witnesses was being
deliberately untruthful. Contradictory versions of facts and opinions in the
presentation of testimony often result from differing recollections of events, from
failures to communicate accurately what one means to say, and especially from
honest differences of expert opinion. With that in mind the following is what the
court believes to be the facts, as established by a preponderance of the evidence and
the applicable law.
12. Each side has 'presented the court with proposed findings of fact and
PACIFICORP DECISION
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14. Pursuant to Idaho law, the real and personal property PacifiCorp uses in
its electric utility operations is designated as "operating property." Idaho Code §
63-201(16). PacifiCorp also has non-operating property.
15. The operating property located in Idaho is subject to assessment by the
Tax Commission, and the Commission is required to determine the market value of
the operating property annually as of January 1st of each year. I.C. §§ 63-204, 205,
207,405. Non-operating property is not valued by the Tax Commission.
16. ""Market value" means the amount of United States dollars or the
equivalent for which, in all probability, a property would exchange hands between a
willing seller, under no compulsion to sell, and an informed, capable buyer, with a
reasonable time allowed to consummate the sale, substantiated by a reasonable
down or full cash payment." I.C. § 63-201(15).
17. The unit method of valuation is preferred for valuing a public utility such
as PacifiCorp. The three traditional approaches to property value -- the cost
approach, the income approach, and the market approach -- may be used. For
interstate property, allocation factors must be used to determine the part of the unit
or system value attributable to Idaho.
18. The appraisal procedures to be used are those procedures, methods, and
techniques accepted by nationally recognized appraisal and valuation
organizations. In using the cost approach, obsolescence, if any should be measured
PACIFICORP DECISION
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electricity by determining a revenue requirement for the company that should
provide it with the opportunity to recover its operating costs and earn a reasonable
market return on its invested capital- the rate base. The revenue requirement
equals expenses plus the product of the rate base times the rate of return
(Revenue Requirement =Expenses + (Rate Base x Rate of Return)).
23. Once PacifiCorp's revenue requirement has been determined by a state
public utilities commission, PacifiCorp usually is not allowed to adjust the rates it
charges until a new rate case is filed with the particular commission, and the
commission issues an order modifying the revenue requirement.
24. PacifiCorp has made significant investments in its property, plant, and
equipment in the years preceding January 1, 2008. It is not allowed, however, to
automatically include the new property in its rate base until it has filed a rate case
and received an order from the appropriate commission authorizing inclusion of the
new properties. Likewise if operating costs increase PacifiCorp usually cannot
recover the increased expenses until it has filed a rate case and received
authorization from the appropriate commission.
25. PacifiCorp has filed rate cases during the past several years to include
newly acquired property and increased expenses in its rates. However, it ordinarily
takes six to eighteen months after filing for a utilities commission to process and
rule on a rate filing. As a result of this regulatory lag, PacifiCorp's earnings are
negatively affected until and if a favorable rate increase is allowed.
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diminution in value due to negative influences outside the property, such as
regulation, regulatory lag, political considerations, and changes in demand.
30. Book depreciation is not calculated for the purpose of estimating the true
difference between original cost and current market value. It does not account for
all forms of functional and external obsolescence that may affect an electric utility's
assets.
31. On June 16, 2008, the Property Tax Bureau ofthe Tax Commission
issued its 2008 appraisal report, prepared by Jerott Rudd, for PacifiCorp. The report
found that the indicators of value of the operating property to be
$11,122,536,280.00, using a type of cost approach known as historic cost less
depreciation (HOLD), and $7,761,521,809.00, using a type of income approach
known as yield capitalization of net operating income (NOI). Mr. Rudd did not use
any type of market approach. He applied 45% weight to the HOLD approach and
55% weight to the NOI approach, resulting in a unit or system value of
$9,273,982,721.00. He reduced this amount by $240,761,350.00 for the value of nontaxable intangible property. He multiplied the result by the Idaho allocation factor
of 3.745822% to obtain an Idaho allocated value of $338,368,433.00. Additional
adjustments for various deductions and exemptions of $74,701,191.00 resulted in a
final estimated Idaho valuation of $263,667,243.00.
32. PacifiOorp protested and received a hearing before the Tax Commission.
PacifiOorp argued that the assessment was erroneous, because it failed to account
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a retired appraiser and auditor for the Utah State Tax Commission, who ordinarily
testifies on behalf oft axing authorities. The Tax Commission also utilized Dr. Ben
Johnson, a consulting economist and president of Ben Johnson Associates, Inc.
37. Each of the witnesses has considerable experience in his particular field.
Nevertheless, having had the special opportunity of listening to each witness as he
gave live testimony and was subjected to rigorous cross examination, the court was
especially impressed by Mr. Tegarden and found his testimony and opinions to be
more credible, more reliable, more persuasive, and entitled to greater weight than
the testimony and opinions of the witnesses for the Tax Commission.
38. Mr. Tegarden researched, inyestigated, prepared, and testified to an
analysis of the unit valuation of PacifiCorp's operating property. His testimony
concerning his methodology and opinions is illustrated in Petitioner's Exhibit 20.
He used the same valuation models employed by Mr. Rudd and the Tax
Commission: the HOLD historical cost less depreciation approach and the yield
capitalization income approach. As with Mr. Rudd but unlike Mr. Eyre, he did not
use any type of market approach and felt that a market analysis, whether by way of
comparable sales or by way of a stock and debt approach, was not useful as an
indicator in attempting to value PacifiCorp's operating property.
39. Turning to the HCLD cost approach to valuation, generally accepted
appraisal principles state that an appraiser may use one or more of three methods
of measuring external or economic obsolescence: (1) allocation of market-extracted
depreciation; (2) analysis of market data; and (3) capitalization of income loss. Mr.
PACIFICORP DECISION
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property. In PacifiCorp's case the net operating income over the immediately
preceding five-year period was approximately 7.2%, while the net operating income
for PacifiCorp's peer group (that is, the expected or allowed market rate of return of
net operating income) was 9.1%, resulting in the previously noted 20.88% negative
difference between PacifiCorp's rate of return and the market rate of return.
Treating this as a measure of external or economic obsolescence resulted in
,

additional depreciation of $2,325, 180,010.00 and reduced the cost indicator of value
to $8,810,739,577.00 ($11,135,919,587 - $2,325,180,010.00 = $8,810,739,577.00).
Mr. Tegarden rounded his cost indicator of value to $8,811,000,000.00.
43. Turning to the income approach to valuation, Mr. Tegarden used the yield
capitalization income approach to obtaining an indicator of value , as did Mr. Rudd,
albeit with a different result. In its simplest terms, the income approach involves a
determination of value based upon cash flow divided by a capitalization rate growth. Mr. Rudd estimated cash flow to be around $690,000,000.00 and the
capitalization rate to be 8.89% resulting in a valuation estimate of
$7,761,529,809.00. Mr. Tegarden estimated cash flow to be around
$750,000,000.00 and the capitalization rate to be around 9.10% resulting a in a
valuation estimate of $8,242,000,000.00.
44. Mr. Tegarden estimated a larger cash flow than Mr. Rudd, because he
attempted to account for future earnings to be derived from rate changes allowed
prior to the valuation date and future earnings to be anticipated as a result of
construction in progress. Mr. Tegarden's capitalization rate was larger than Mr.
PACIFICORP DECISION
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$8,350,000,000.00 (19% x $8,811,000,000.00[cost approach] + 81% x
$8,242,000,000.00 [income approach] = $8,350,110,000.00). As noted, the allocation
was based on his opinion that the income approach resulted in a far more accurate
estimate of valuation than the HCLD approach.
48. The court has reviewed the criticisms of Mr. Tegarden's valuations but
finds them to be unpersuasive
49. After evaluating all the evidence the court concludes that Mr. Tegarden's
estimate of the value ofPacifiCorp's operating property as of January 1, 2008, is the
most accurate estimate of value in the record. Implicit in this conclusion is the
additional conclusion that the estimate of value of $8,877,075,014.00 in the Tax
Commission's decision necessarily is erroneous.
50. Mr. Tegarden applied the same Idaho allocation factor of 3.745822%
used by the Tax commission and the same adjustments and exemptions used by the
Tax Commission to arrive at a net estimated Idaho value for PacifiCorp's operating
property of $230,680,003.00 as of January 1, 2008. Calculations of the adjustments,
exemptions, and Idaho allocation factor do not appear to be in dispute.
51. Based on the foregoing analysis, the court concludes that the order of the
Tax Commission was erroneous and that the case should be remanded to the Tax
Commission to re-set the value of PacifiCorp's Idaho operating property at
$230,680,003.00 as of the January 1, 2008 assessment date.
52. The court has no information on the amount of any tax refund owed to
PacifiCorp because of the erroneous valuation.
PACIFICORP DECISION
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